Yuku free message boards

>Why was there so many defeats for the Army of the Potomac in the early stages of the war? was it really the commanders or the constant bickering with in the White House that was streaming down to the field command for more agressive movement and action? <

Several new authors have resurfaced the issue of military/political competency in their writing. Russel Beattie (sic) is in the process of retelling this tale. (Book 3 in his series just shipped from Amazon yesterday and will arrive next week). Ethan Rafuse has a new study on McC last year. I don't know that any of these book are definitive in addressing the problem of Republican command and control. The problem being that in addressing strategy both the political arm and the professional soldiery have to be sensitive to requiremnts and work TOGETHER to make viable strategy. (Like we aren't living with the same hellish dilema in Iraq right at the moment.)

Winfield Scott had a very limited appreciation for the scope of the war. It caused the politicoes to doubt his reliability. When McC showed up in Washington with a larger sense of scale and operational necessity he was made General in Chief.

But once he became General in Chief McC shunned the politicals and demanded absolute control over strategy trying to isolate himself from his bosses. It was a fatal mistake. McC's first challenge was to win/maintain the confidence and concurrence of the political arm. He didn't do that when he sent his father in law in his stead to make excuses for him.

McC infected his command with a military effetism that challenged the political side of the national command. This created a false friction that remained until Grant came east. Juxtapose Grant with McC in dealing with Stanton and Lincoln: when McClellan had a problem he wrote epistles and achemed behind his bosses backs; when Grant had a sync problem he got on a boat and headed for Washington to sit down with his political superiors and ironed out the issues.

The other aspect of the political military disconnect in the east was the initial lack of a warrior at the helm of the AoP. McC simply hated to settle things by force of arms. He constantly hesitated to fight. His victories were usually defensive. His one truly offensive battle was Antietam; he was on the verge of a devastating strategic victory and blinked at the moment of decision because he couldn't see the obvious signs on the battlefield.

Burnside was a man of limited talents. In contrast to McC he really tried to please Lincoln. His muddle came with command failures within the ranks of the army because he so badly handled his campaign. (That and he had absolutely no luck with the weather - the man seemed truly cursed by God.) In failure Burnside turned on Halleck and Stanton blaming them for lack of support.

Hooker was a wild card. Although a West Pointer he had quit the army. He had bad reputation for lack of self discipline; although his reorg of the army was brilliant. Hooker had the same problem as other West Pointers, demanding non-interference from his superiors. This unnecessary friction ruined Hooker after he failed at Chancellorsville.

George Meade marked something of a turning point for the AoP command. Meade was a career engineer, but proved himself more of a warrior than his predecessors. Gettysburg was hugely sucessful as a bloodfest. What the Washington command failed to appreciate was that it crippled Meade as badly as it did Lee. Lincoln hoped for exploitation of what was achieved on the battlefield but the AoP was spent. Meade could do little the rest of 1863 as replacements didn't come, and two of his Corps were dispatched west. (Still Meade did achieve two small victories at Mine Run and Rappahanock Station.)

You know, when you talk specifically about the Army of the Potomac, it really isn't tha case that there were "so many defeats". Literally we are talking about Seven Days, Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. (Cedar Mtn and 2d Manassas were AoV - Pope.)

In the Seven Days there were 6 major actions; three of which were won by the AoP. Malvern Hill was so decisively successful that McC's generals tried to persuade him to retain the high ground and consider counteroffensive.

Antietam was a win.

Fredericksburg was a total failure. Causalties for the AoP weren't actually bad considering, but the disorder in the army was devastating.

Chancellorville was a muddle. The troops thought they had done well and were perplexed as to why they lost.

I'm not trying to let Washington off the hook for some very stupid things they did. One o fthe worst was Stanton's decision to demobilize recruiting in April 1862. The decision to split command and control into two field armies Pope and McC was ultimately a poor one, but it was motivated by a need to consolidate the forces fighting Jackson into a unified command. McC would cry allegator tears that having McDowell removed form his command caused his defeat; but in fact McDowell's veteran divisions were detached and sent to McC leaving McDowell with green replacement divisions from Washington.

Sorry this is a little muddled. One key point is the need for strategic synchronicity between the national command and field commanders on strategy. Distrust between the civilian authority and the military professionals was a problem. There was no effective bridge. McC abrogated his General in Chief responsibilities. Monty Meigs would have made a fine General in Chief based on his past dealings with the political system; but he had no credentials with what passed for the line community of the time.

The other issue is the "warrior' mindset. Lee and Jackson had it. (Even Bragg.) Grant, Thomas, Rosecrans had it. McC DEFINITELY did not. Burnside was just ineffective. Hooker is a bit of a qestion mark.

For me Grant is the model. In spite of some operational mistakes along the way, his handling of the political and military aspects of senior command was a cut above everybody else. He turned Stanton's spies into his lapdogs (Dana), kept the press friendly, smoothed relations with Stanton and proved his ability on the battlefield.