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>The last chance for the south to turn back Grant was probably at the North Anna river. Given the casualties in The Wilderness and Spotsylvania, if Lee and the ANV had destroyed Hancock's corp when they were trapped in the Inverted V, it would have been very difficult for Grant to contine the Overland campaign. The pressure on Lincoln for withdrawal would have been too great to resist.

It's true the south lost the war in the West, but it's a different ballgame if Grant had been forced to retreat less than three weeks after Overland began with two and half to three times the number of casualties the AOP had at Gettysburg.<

Hello Jack:

Speculatively, it's one thing to suggest that such a win and a retreat by the AoP might have changed the outcome of things, but I don't think such an outcome most likely given conditions for both sides.

1. Ops tempo in May had exhausted both armies by the end of Spotsylvania. Besides combat attrition, running for three weeks on unimaginative combat rations was wearing thin on everybody. Key decision makers at North Anna were too sick to exploit opportunities. (Cold Harbor would be worse.)

2. Whatever happened: GRANT WOULD NEVER RETREAT. He might go on a protracted defensive to regroup and refit, but his strategic mandate to try to win the war before Mar 65 precluded any move that would deliberately surrender any initiative to Lee. (Like when Grant let his own men die on the field instead of admitting defeat to Lee by requesting a cease fire. ) Even if the 2d Corps got whacked, Ben Butler was just down the road doing nothing....

>Kelly,

The picture you paint is a little different from Jones, I think. You suggest simple, old fashioned "smash mouth" war...hit them where you find them; hurt them as much as you can; and keep hurting them until they quit.

Jones makes it sound as if there was more finesse involved....more thought, planning and strategy.

Certainly the ferocity of Grant's actions in Virginia suggest your point of view more so than his. By that I mean he seemed intent on more than just "tying up Lee" in Virginia while Sherman had all the fun in Georgia.

Thanks,
Steve <

I love A Jones. The first book on approaching Southern strategy I ever read was his "Confederate Strategy from Shiloh to Vicksburg". As a matured (over ripe) student I've found CW Command and Strategy to be less to my liking. Jones theorem of warfare seems to be imposed on Union strategy rather than borne out by it.

Don't necessarily care or ask folks for references in conversation. In this case needed to know so I could pull the book down and get reacquainted. (Particularly with Chapter 15).

Jones is much taken with the concept of "strategic raiding". Believing that annihilation warfare just didn't work because the defender had all the advantages, Jones believes that the North best strategy was to logistically break the South by strangling their logistics system and conducting grand raids to break the will of the populace. One problem to this theorem is how do you deal with the enemies main battle forces when your strategy wants to avoid destructive offensive battle but you have to tie up the Lees and Johnston's so they don't go on the offensive themselves.

Fact is you can't "raid" as long as the opponent has main strength. You have to dissipate or break those forces first. On this point Jones discussion is weak. He persists in holding up the superiority of the raid in spite of the fact that the first priority was the elimination of main forces. (As Grants execution orders so dictated.)

The evolution of Grant's ascendancy in 63-64 is not a well told tale. The myth has smoothed it out into glorious heavenly mandated ritual to ordained victory. Grant's promotion to LTG wasn't actively sought by the national command. Grant's chief political friend Eliahu Washbourne sprung it on Lincoln and the Congress. Action on the bill was held up until the end of the session in March 64. Lincoln and Stanton wanted to size up Grant as a potential political rival and workmate: too many generals had come east with promises that didn't match what command required in this war.

After Chattanooga Halleck's communications with Grant attempted to sound him out on national strategy. Grant was operating unified theaters of the whole western region and was too busy to speculate on someone elses problems. He either tasked or accepted Baldy Smith's help in preparing a response to Halleck. All that Grant's answer proffered to Halleck was the suggestion that operations against Lee should be modified to include a force, perhaps originating from Suffolk that would sweep across the rail lines on the North Carolina border and cut Lee's and Richmond's supply lines. Such a move would either force Lee to hunker down and starve in Richmond, or turn South to reopen his communications; only to be trapped between two Union armies.

Jones refers to Hallecks response to Grant's suggestion as "confused". I part company with Jones here. Halleck's response to Grant was a detailed precis on how Washington percieved the strategic state of affairs going into the 64 campaign and pretty much told Grant what was going to be expected of him when he assumed command.

Halleck had entered the war as an advocate of the strategy of persistence and victory through logistically exhausting the south. His one campaign in the field had bloodlessly caused Beauregard to abandon Tennessee to Halleck, and yielded up Memphis and control of rail lines in northern Alabama. But this sort of warfare proved to have its own liabilities. Disease killed faster than bullets and long warfare was wasting lives prodigeously with nothing to show for it. There was also that problem of policeing overrun areas to keep them militarily pacified. Then not dealing with the oppositions potent main forces embarassed the Union army politically as they seemed to lose every fight in 62-63. Halleck changed his tune when he spent some time in Washington. The first military objective had to be the breaking of the enemies main armies.

I don't think Grant was ever an advocate of "raiding". That was Sherman's gambit. Grant's appreciated what Liddell-Hart characterised as "indirect approach"; the shaping of battle in such a manner as to bring the opponent to battle where and when he is most disadvantaged by your maneuver and strategems employed to confuse him. Vicksburg best exemplified this sort of campaign. Recall Grant actually rebuffed Sherman's proposed raid across Georgia primarily because he was ignoring Hood.

When Grant comes east in 64 he is expected to execute a spring campaign on relatively short notice with forces and commanders already in place. He has little time to evaluate his subordinates or change what is out there. What changes are made conform to the annihilation campaign policy Halleck proposed. Satellite theaters are stripped of forces to beef up the main armies and theater commanders are ordered to take the offensive in the first week of may with the object of defeatig the opposing enemy to their respective fronts. Most lesser theater commanders fail in their missions within the first three weeks of the campaign commencement. The AoP is in a near state of ruin by the end of June. Only Sherman and Johnston have the capacity to continue since both have been frugal.

By July it appears as though the federal bid for a rapid offensive conclusion of the war has failed. The Democratic peace at any price platform appears to be gaining traction. Lincoln dolfully predicts his own political failure. As previously mentioned, Grant writes Sherman that he will have to soldier on in the west by himself as Grant's campaign was faltering. Lee, in what was really an act of desperation, had split his command sending 30% of his army to the Shenandoah region under Early. Lee first priority had been to try and save his bread basket from being overrun. But when Early proved to be having an easy time against less capable federal adversaries Lee fed more troops that way to create a diversion, as had worked in 1862. Early threatened Washington and Grant was forced to divert forces away from his primary target to dispose of Early. Lee gained time and supplies. (But in the end reaped a calamity. This proxy campaign may have bought time, but Early and his cocky generals made the mistake of trying to overawe a superior force at Cedar Creek instead of disengaging and returning to Petersburg. Sheridan was revitalizing offensive warfare in the Valley, using the vastly improved federal cavalry service in close support to his infantry. With skillful handling Sheridan was doing something unheard of in the glory days of the ANV: he was causing an eastern grey army to stampede off the field in disorder a la AoP at it's worst. )

The Confederacy absorbed the blows of the 64 campaign by stripping the South of most available resrves of manpower. Into the fall Lee managed to keep close to a 3:5 ratio with his opponent. Early's crippling loses in the Valley and Lincolns reelection was the start of the fatal deterioration of the ANV. In the west Johnston had grandfathered his manpower reserves up to Atlanta. He was relieved in favor of Hood who took command and tried to take up offensive style warfare resulting in a series of battles that upset the manpower balance between the armies; which allowed Sherman to stretch the field and cut the rails feeding the city. Hood abandoned Atlanta on 31 Aug 64. After Atlanta Hood hovered around Sherman's flank and rear looking for opportunities to break communications and try to nibble at Sherman's forces. This cat and mouse went on for 10 weeks. Hood grew tired of small warfare and conceived of a raid into TN to try and draw Sherman backwards. Bragg and Davis had reservations, but Hood went and did it anyway. While all of this was festering Lincoln won the election. Sherman persuaded Grant that Thomas could stop Hood while Sherman took the cream of the army and conducted the "great raid" tearing across Georgia and the Carolinas demonstrating CSA helplessness.

My reasoning "against" the theorem of raids. Sherman and Grant spent most of the time breaking the main armies in their fronts. The serious raiding didn't start until these field forces had been nullified.

>"Command friction" at Cold Harbor...I'll buy that...The Brock rd. incident between Meade and Sheridan must have played a big role. After his victory on June 1, Sheridan just pulled all of his cavalry out of Cold Harbor and he was done. I'm sure Meade was steamed.

I wasn't clear about the North Anna, so here goes...

IMO, win or lose, Lee had to attack. He put it best..."We have to destroy this army of Grant's before he crosses the James."

I'm not saying Lee could have stopped Grant, but it was his last chance. Why Lee didn't put Jubal Early in command and tell him to cut loose is beyond me.

Hill was still sick. Anderson was over his head. The stress and his bad leg made Ewell unfit for command.

Lee had Early, Gordon and Ramseur lined up and ready to go. Three weeks later, they were in the Valley and headed toward the Potomac.

Kelly, do you remember the convo we had about the Peeble Farm--Poplar Springs Church offensive? I thought Grant called it off too early but you purty much convinced me he made the right move. The North Anna is a similar convo.......

"purty much convinced"...But in the back of my mind methinks Grant should have given Meade another shot.

ONE MORE PUSH... <

Probably should wait to Saturday to engage in this Jack, just because job commitments for the 24 hrs will divert my attention. Haven't read Rhea on this ground so you have me at a disadvantage.

Neither side opened this action with "ready" defenses. Fighting initially began on the north side of the river with federals driving off security elements holding the fords and bridges on 23 May. A late in the day effort by Hill against Warrren resulted in a smallish fight at Jerhico Mills crossing point. Lee busied himself with entrenching and allowed the AoP to do likewise. It wasn't until 26 May that the Union command decided that Lee was too strongly posted and the AoP position was too attenuated for anything to be accomplished. So federals pulled out on the night of 26-27 May.

During this time frame Lee recieved significant reinforcements with the return of Picketts Division, addition of Breckenridges troops from the Valley, an two NC Bdes. (aprox 8000 troops). This didn't quite make good the losses for the month, but did put Lees army well back into its familiar 3:5 odds against AoP.

Lee would be greatly upset that the AoP got away without being punished, but just when and where that was supposed to happen is unclear to me given the timing of events and unfitness of staff principals.

Don't understand your remark about Early, Jack. I'm not impressed by Early. He was a good soldier, but he didn't have the ability to command and win a battle. There is this skill, intuition and/or voodoo effecting commanders who can make victories. Early didn't have it.

Leave it there til Saturday. You can educate me on Rhea opinion of the situation, I gotta pull out DS Freeman and reacquaint myself there. Recollect that North Anna was another place where Lee wanted to belt AP Hill for not meeting his expectations as a Corps Commander. (ala Mine Run) Or maybe Lee was just frustrated at his own illness and the breakdown of his chain of command because too many players were off game.

Understand your presentament of Lee sense of urgency in attempting to find a way of turning back the federals before he is pinned to Richmond. You capture a real sense of need Lee felt; to avoid being hemmed in and winding up another trophy head next to John Pemberton and Simon Buckner in Grants Den.

However, while INTENT may be one thing, CONDITIONS may rule out any possibility for getting to them. What Lee didn't achieve at North Anna he got partial consolation for at Cold Harbor.