In previous discussions I have heard and had to put up with many remarks on Longstreet's overall conduct of slowness at 2nd Manassas and would like to finish off with my final chapter of defense toward my absolutely, favorite general, Lt. Gen. James Longstreet.
I believe the comments of slowness are unjust and are based on (if you know it or not) from Jubal Early's accusations toward "Longstreet's history of slow marches". He disgraces Longstreet on many fronts such as here at 2nd Manassas, Gettysburg, and the Wilderness.
The Charges against Longstreet are as follows, which I stubbornly and faithfully protest:
Early accused Longstreet of:
1. Slow to Reach the Battlefield
2. 3 times refused Lee's call for an attack on the 29th
3. Failed to commit his troops ASAP on the 30th
4. Claimed too much credit for the success of the battle
Now let me explain some things here...
Sources: "General James Longstreet..."By Jeffry Wert
"Lee and His Generals in War and Memory"...By Gary Gallagher
NPS 2nd Manassas Booklet
Many of these statements were blatent lies according to Gallagher. Writers, Eckinrode and Conrad believed that Lee "premitted Longstreet to shape events somewhat, because Longstreet was so masterful, so certain of himself, so self- expressive, while Lee, was uncertain of himself, and always repressed.
The implication that Lee viewed Jackson rather than Longstreet as his principal Lieutenent during the campaign is inaccurate. In the wake of the Seven Days, Lee secured the transfer of a number of senior major generals serving in the AONV, leaving Longstreet his ranking subordinate. Lee gave Longstreet a lot of credit for his part in the Seven Days Battle prompting a staff officer to remark that:
"Genrl Longstreet has undoubtedly aquired as much or more reputation than any other officer in this army. He is now next in command in Virginia to General Lee."
Longstreet was alo chosen as second in command when Lee reorganized the AONV into 2 corps.
More Detail:........
"The Charge that Longstreet was slow in reaching the battlefield at 2nd Manassas also lacks foundation".- Gallagher
Lee ordered him to leave his positions along the Rappahancok on the afternoon of the 26th of August. After an 11 mile march Longstreet's divisions, minus Anderson's, stayed that night in Orleans. Moving without adequete calvary (most of which was sent to Jackson), the column sufferered a number of delays on the 27th, but made it past Salem to spend the night near White Plains. The first phase of Longstreet's march had matched the performance of Jackson's "foot-calvary" over the same route a day and a half before. On the road again before dawn, the first of Longstreet's troops reached Thoroughfare Gap by midafternoon of the 28th. Lee was pleased with Longstreet's progress. A courier from Jackson informed Lee of Jackson's position; other messages brought news that the gap was clear of federals. Confident, Lee ordered Longstreet's column to sleep for the night so the men would be fresh on the 29th. Those instructions manifestly did not come from a commander unhappy with the pace of the Longstreet's march.
As it turned out, the confederates did have to fight for Thoroughfare Gap on the evening of the 28th, which Jackson said was clear. The soldier's of Longstreet's wing were in motion again at daylight on the 29th of August, with Hood in the lead followed by Kemper, Jones, and Wilcox. They struck the Warrenton Turnpike by 9:00 A.M. Within another hour, the head of Hood's column reached Jackson's right. Lee and Longstreet both arrived on the field about 10:00 A.M, and by Noon Longstreet had deployed almost all of his men.
"To summarize, in less than three days Longstreet's veterans shifted from their position on the Rappahnock to the battlefield. They did so without the adequete help of calvary screen, and in the course of their journey fought for the possession of Thoroughfare Gap. By any reasonable standard, it was an excellent march that compared favorably with what Jackson's troops accomplished in covering the same ground."- Gallagher
Longstreet was now on the field, and it is at this point where critics have painted the most tainted, and unflattering picture of his performance. Lee first urged Longstreet to strike the Union left just after Noon. Longstreet quite properly wanted to check the ground first (had Pope taken this elementary precaution the next day he would have spared a great deal of grief). In an hour's reconnassance he found that federals exntended well south of the warrenton Turnpike and occupied strong ground. There was also an unconfirmed report of Union troops at Manassas Junction. If that were true, it was possible a federal flanking maneuver could strike the right of any assualting column Longstreet might form.
"Lee was somewhat skeptical at first, but as he and Longstreet discussed the problem, Confederate calvary chief Jeb Stuart sent news that a Union Force was indeed approaching from the southeast along the Manassas-Gainesville road. A *dissapointed Lee agreed that nothing should be done until he knew more about the Union threat.
*Lee was dissapointed that he could not attack at that time; not at Longstreet--like some have recently commented to
Longstreet reinforced his right with Wilcox's brigades and rode out for another look. He returned to tell Lee that the threat in his immediate front was not too serious but that a signifficant amount of dust rising from the direction of Manassa indicated that more federals might be on their way. Lee suggested attack, but Longstreet preferred to wait for concrete word about the federals at Manassas, and Lee agreed to postpone the assult a while longer...but more information began to come in which suggested that the troops coming from Manassas were Fitz John Porter's 5th Corp. LEE DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE UNSOUND TO MOVE WITH A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS THREAT TO LONGSTREET'S RIGHT AND WAS DETERMINED TO LOOK AT THE SITUATION HIMSELF.
In an hour, Lee was back. He and Longstreet, who had also taken another look at the situation, concurred that the "Union menace, was hardly strong enough to mean aggressive work from that quarter." Lee wanted an assualt for a third time. It was well past 4:00 P.M. Longstreet sited the lateness of the hour as a daterrent to launching a DECISIVE ATTACK and called for a reconnasaince-in-force later that evening. If an opening could be found, preparations could be made during the night for a massive counterstroke along the Warrenton Turnpike at dawn on the 30th. Lee consented to follow Longstreet's proposed course.
Important--***
Just after 6:00 P.M Hood advanced and engaged in a confusing, bitter fight with Federals along the turnpike. Hood, was a bold, even reckless at times type of fighter, yet he quickly decided to oppose an attack in the morning over the same ground. Support for Hood's recommendation came from Cadmus M. Wilcox, who spent more than 2 hours examining the Union lines after the fighting died down. "FACED WITH SUCH ADVICE, LEE CANCELLED PLANS TO ASSAULT THE NEXT MORNING. HE HOPED THAT POPE WOULD ATTACK HIM AND LEAVE AN OPENING FOR A COUNTERATTACK."
****Summary of the 29th---"In every instance subsequent intelligence proved Longstreet's caution well grounded. Longstreet was not headstrong or sullen Lieutenent on August 29th; he was alert and careful and served his chief well. And it is a pertinent note that his conduct on the 29th was dramatically different from that of Jackson several weeks earlier, when Stonewall and thousands of troops lay idle at White Oak Swamp as their comrades waged a furious battle a short distance away."
- Wert
****The allegation that Longstreet was slow to attack on the 30th can be dismissed quickly. Lee wanted to see Pope resume the offensive that day.
****Colonel Charles Marshall of Lee's Staff recalled that, "We hoped that we would be attacked. I think the hope that we would be attacked caused General Lee to defer any action that he may have taken that morning."
When the Union assaults did come the next day...
"Jackson asked Lee and Longstreet or help, Longstreet responded quickly by summoning batteries to help break up the federal formations. Then, anticipating Lee's order he sent his entire wing forward in a well-executed counterattack (his troops were in good position because he had prepared them to launch the diversion later that night). The commitment of 30,000 men in half an hour was a remarkable performance, unmatched on any other battlefield of the war. Lee could not have asked for a better response from a subodinate than he got from Longstreet on the afternoon of August 30".- Gallagher
It is understandable that Longstreet would undermine Jackson's actions at 2nd Manassas, but that does not excuse his ungenerous treatment of Jackson for the battle. In short, Longstreet was jealous of Jackson's reputation.
"That Jackson was clever there is no doubt, but that he was superhuman as Virginians who have written about him would have the world believe there is no room for grave doubts.", Longstreet wrote to a northern friend in 1885.
Lee continued to rely on Longstreet after the Battle of 2nd Manassas, making him the ranking corp commander when the AONV reorganized later that Fall, and without exception demonstrated trust and affection for Old Pete.
"THE STORY OF JAMES LONGSTREET AND SECOND MANASSAS IS A PRIMER ON HOW POLITICS, PREJUDICE, AND SELF- INTEREST OFTEN INFLUENCE THE WAY IN WHICH SUBSEQUENT GENERATIONS PERCIEVE HISTORICAL EVENTS."
-Jeffry Wert
Few
I believe the comments of slowness are unjust and are based on (if you know it or not) from Jubal Early's accusations toward "Longstreet's history of slow marches". He disgraces Longstreet on many fronts such as here at 2nd Manassas, Gettysburg, and the Wilderness.
The Charges against Longstreet are as follows, which I stubbornly and faithfully protest:
Early accused Longstreet of:
1. Slow to Reach the Battlefield
2. 3 times refused Lee's call for an attack on the 29th
3. Failed to commit his troops ASAP on the 30th
4. Claimed too much credit for the success of the battle
Now let me explain some things here...
Sources: "General James Longstreet..."By Jeffry Wert
"Lee and His Generals in War and Memory"...By Gary Gallagher
NPS 2nd Manassas Booklet
Many of these statements were blatent lies according to Gallagher. Writers, Eckinrode and Conrad believed that Lee "premitted Longstreet to shape events somewhat, because Longstreet was so masterful, so certain of himself, so self- expressive, while Lee, was uncertain of himself, and always repressed.
The implication that Lee viewed Jackson rather than Longstreet as his principal Lieutenent during the campaign is inaccurate. In the wake of the Seven Days, Lee secured the transfer of a number of senior major generals serving in the AONV, leaving Longstreet his ranking subordinate. Lee gave Longstreet a lot of credit for his part in the Seven Days Battle prompting a staff officer to remark that:
"Genrl Longstreet has undoubtedly aquired as much or more reputation than any other officer in this army. He is now next in command in Virginia to General Lee."
Longstreet was alo chosen as second in command when Lee reorganized the AONV into 2 corps.
More Detail:........
"The Charge that Longstreet was slow in reaching the battlefield at 2nd Manassas also lacks foundation".- Gallagher
Lee ordered him to leave his positions along the Rappahancok on the afternoon of the 26th of August. After an 11 mile march Longstreet's divisions, minus Anderson's, stayed that night in Orleans. Moving without adequete calvary (most of which was sent to Jackson), the column sufferered a number of delays on the 27th, but made it past Salem to spend the night near White Plains. The first phase of Longstreet's march had matched the performance of Jackson's "foot-calvary" over the same route a day and a half before. On the road again before dawn, the first of Longstreet's troops reached Thoroughfare Gap by midafternoon of the 28th. Lee was pleased with Longstreet's progress. A courier from Jackson informed Lee of Jackson's position; other messages brought news that the gap was clear of federals. Confident, Lee ordered Longstreet's column to sleep for the night so the men would be fresh on the 29th. Those instructions manifestly did not come from a commander unhappy with the pace of the Longstreet's march.
As it turned out, the confederates did have to fight for Thoroughfare Gap on the evening of the 28th, which Jackson said was clear. The soldier's of Longstreet's wing were in motion again at daylight on the 29th of August, with Hood in the lead followed by Kemper, Jones, and Wilcox. They struck the Warrenton Turnpike by 9:00 A.M. Within another hour, the head of Hood's column reached Jackson's right. Lee and Longstreet both arrived on the field about 10:00 A.M, and by Noon Longstreet had deployed almost all of his men.
"To summarize, in less than three days Longstreet's veterans shifted from their position on the Rappahnock to the battlefield. They did so without the adequete help of calvary screen, and in the course of their journey fought for the possession of Thoroughfare Gap. By any reasonable standard, it was an excellent march that compared favorably with what Jackson's troops accomplished in covering the same ground."- Gallagher
Longstreet was now on the field, and it is at this point where critics have painted the most tainted, and unflattering picture of his performance. Lee first urged Longstreet to strike the Union left just after Noon. Longstreet quite properly wanted to check the ground first (had Pope taken this elementary precaution the next day he would have spared a great deal of grief). In an hour's reconnassance he found that federals exntended well south of the warrenton Turnpike and occupied strong ground. There was also an unconfirmed report of Union troops at Manassas Junction. If that were true, it was possible a federal flanking maneuver could strike the right of any assualting column Longstreet might form.
"Lee was somewhat skeptical at first, but as he and Longstreet discussed the problem, Confederate calvary chief Jeb Stuart sent news that a Union Force was indeed approaching from the southeast along the Manassas-Gainesville road. A *dissapointed Lee agreed that nothing should be done until he knew more about the Union threat.
*Lee was dissapointed that he could not attack at that time; not at Longstreet--like some have recently commented to
Longstreet reinforced his right with Wilcox's brigades and rode out for another look. He returned to tell Lee that the threat in his immediate front was not too serious but that a signifficant amount of dust rising from the direction of Manassa indicated that more federals might be on their way. Lee suggested attack, but Longstreet preferred to wait for concrete word about the federals at Manassas, and Lee agreed to postpone the assult a while longer...but more information began to come in which suggested that the troops coming from Manassas were Fitz John Porter's 5th Corp. LEE DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE UNSOUND TO MOVE WITH A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS THREAT TO LONGSTREET'S RIGHT AND WAS DETERMINED TO LOOK AT THE SITUATION HIMSELF.
In an hour, Lee was back. He and Longstreet, who had also taken another look at the situation, concurred that the "Union menace, was hardly strong enough to mean aggressive work from that quarter." Lee wanted an assualt for a third time. It was well past 4:00 P.M. Longstreet sited the lateness of the hour as a daterrent to launching a DECISIVE ATTACK and called for a reconnasaince-in-force later that evening. If an opening could be found, preparations could be made during the night for a massive counterstroke along the Warrenton Turnpike at dawn on the 30th. Lee consented to follow Longstreet's proposed course.
Important--***
Just after 6:00 P.M Hood advanced and engaged in a confusing, bitter fight with Federals along the turnpike. Hood, was a bold, even reckless at times type of fighter, yet he quickly decided to oppose an attack in the morning over the same ground. Support for Hood's recommendation came from Cadmus M. Wilcox, who spent more than 2 hours examining the Union lines after the fighting died down. "FACED WITH SUCH ADVICE, LEE CANCELLED PLANS TO ASSAULT THE NEXT MORNING. HE HOPED THAT POPE WOULD ATTACK HIM AND LEAVE AN OPENING FOR A COUNTERATTACK."
****Summary of the 29th---"In every instance subsequent intelligence proved Longstreet's caution well grounded. Longstreet was not headstrong or sullen Lieutenent on August 29th; he was alert and careful and served his chief well. And it is a pertinent note that his conduct on the 29th was dramatically different from that of Jackson several weeks earlier, when Stonewall and thousands of troops lay idle at White Oak Swamp as their comrades waged a furious battle a short distance away."
- Wert
****The allegation that Longstreet was slow to attack on the 30th can be dismissed quickly. Lee wanted to see Pope resume the offensive that day.
****Colonel Charles Marshall of Lee's Staff recalled that, "We hoped that we would be attacked. I think the hope that we would be attacked caused General Lee to defer any action that he may have taken that morning."
When the Union assaults did come the next day...
"Jackson asked Lee and Longstreet or help, Longstreet responded quickly by summoning batteries to help break up the federal formations. Then, anticipating Lee's order he sent his entire wing forward in a well-executed counterattack (his troops were in good position because he had prepared them to launch the diversion later that night). The commitment of 30,000 men in half an hour was a remarkable performance, unmatched on any other battlefield of the war. Lee could not have asked for a better response from a subodinate than he got from Longstreet on the afternoon of August 30".- Gallagher
It is understandable that Longstreet would undermine Jackson's actions at 2nd Manassas, but that does not excuse his ungenerous treatment of Jackson for the battle. In short, Longstreet was jealous of Jackson's reputation.
"That Jackson was clever there is no doubt, but that he was superhuman as Virginians who have written about him would have the world believe there is no room for grave doubts.", Longstreet wrote to a northern friend in 1885.
Lee continued to rely on Longstreet after the Battle of 2nd Manassas, making him the ranking corp commander when the AONV reorganized later that Fall, and without exception demonstrated trust and affection for Old Pete.
"THE STORY OF JAMES LONGSTREET AND SECOND MANASSAS IS A PRIMER ON HOW POLITICS, PREJUDICE, AND SELF- INTEREST OFTEN INFLUENCE THE WAY IN WHICH SUBSEQUENT GENERATIONS PERCIEVE HISTORICAL EVENTS."
-Jeffry Wert
Few
