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In regards to the topic post- I mean specifically around the time of September-October 1861, after the Union had scored some of its early (and successful) naval victories at Cape Hatteras in NC and Ship Island in the Gulf. It was at this time, even after the advent of the Confederate victories at Manassas and Wilson's Creek in Missouri- that Jefferson Davis was bound firmly to the strategic defensive. In this light, Davis was unwilling to move units from one portion of the south to another for fear that one opportunity for success would be coupled with an opening for disaster. This was also a time, with McClellan at the head of the Union army in the Eastern Theater- and given command of all Union armies by November 1, 1861- was acquiring new recruits to the tune of 40,000 men per month. Even at this remarkable rate of recruitment, McClellan was being told by his Chief of Intelligence, Allan Pinkerton, that the Johnston-Beauregard alliance in Virginia had a strength of 100,000 to 150,000 men- denoting the notion that he was badly outnumbered, considering that he was to be the invading army. That notion would even be extended more with the Union defeat and embarassing debacle at the Battle of Ball's Bluff- where the Union, bottle necked on a cow path, suffered some 1,000 casualties, 700 of which were captured. The Confederates in this instance not having superior numbers- three Mississippi regiments and one Virginian.

Even with all the pomp and splendor of McClellan's first few months as head of the AOP- with all the newspapers raving about his perfect bodily proportions and splendid neck- his gentleman-like ardour- sincere love for his troops, with reciprocation- his balance of discipline and justice---McClellan himself was plagued with worry and a lack of confidence, stating things like: "I flatter myself that Beauregard has gained his last victory...I have scarcely slept one moment for the last three nights, knowing well that the enemy intend some movement and fully recognizing our own weakness. If Beauregard does not attack tonight I shall look upon it as a dispensation of Providence. He ought to do it." George B. McClellan was a man of splendid outward appearance, always putting forth an air of confidence that would inspire anyone to follow him to whatever end. But under all of that- and what is evident in many of his letters to his wife, of which surviving correspondence we have much, is a man who is tormented by his own inability to inject confidence into a large scale, offensive effort. In essence, even if the military prowess was present in McClellan's mind, it was always hindered by an inability to committ.

So with this stage set, as far as the eastern theater goes (Washington-Richmond- Maryland-VA area)- I question the opinion that Beauregard's plan for an offensive was too grandiose for implementation. It seems more plausible and strategic than most have given him credit for. Note that this question does not seek to be speculative- merely laying out the facts and making an educated judgement of some sort. For Beauregard's army, volunteering had fallen off with expirations of short-term enlistments, liberal granting of furloughs, the army being crippled by a shortage of supplies and arms- food as well as munitions- but was this not the case for all Confederate armies through the extent of the war? Was not the northern army under McClellan- even looking past their unconfident commander- still racked by a state of shock from the defeat it had taken two months back?

With the Union now beginning their implementation of a version of Scott's Anaconda Plan- seizing principle deltas and ports with the efforts of the naval and ground troops- and their announced objective to divide and conquer the south by a descent of the Mississippi- was this not an opportunity for the south to act? Beauregard's plan was to cross the Potomac and divide the Union, east and west, by seizing the strip of territory between Pittsburgh and Lake Erie. Perhaps the opposition to such a plan- then and now- will be that the odds were too long, but the opinion can be extended that they were shorter than they were likely to be at any time thereafter- especially if the Confederates remained passive and continued to allow the growing enemy host time in which to regain its confidence.

Of course, P.G.T asked for 50,000 troops as an invasion force, with 60,000 holding out with Johnston in VA- which meant that at that point, Davis would have had to find somewhere between 10 and 20,000 reinforcements for the move. Davis saw this as impracticable at the present time because of the current Union strategy of search and seizure- citing the example of the loss of Hatteras exposing New Bern, and New Bern exposing the Weldon Railroad, the only supply line between Richmond and the Southern Atlantic states. No reinforcements could be sent, he said, without "a total disregard for the safety of other threatened positions." Nevertheless, such an plan by Beauregard may have had some opportunity and merit- pulling a portion of McClellan's army (not the whole, as McClellan would not have left Washington open to 60,000 troops under Johnston) away from Washington- testing the young general's mettle on enemy ground- a strategic point, splitting Union east from west. How would Washington, Lincoln, and McClellan for that matter have reacted is certainly a pressing question.

Strategically the region was of great importance as well. One can note the location of the Ohio River along the far western edge, which flowed toward the heart of Kentucky. Towards the north ran two vital supply lines, and the B&O Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. With those severed I would think Washington would have had to find a roundabout way for drawing men and supplies from the west. And still, most importantly, with a 100 mile tract of land dividing the northward jut of West Virginia's tiny panhandle from the shores of Lake Erie, it was a worthy location to launch an offensive such as the one proposed by Beauregard.

The description above, itself, were some of the opportunities which lay at the feet of Robert E. Lee during his 1861 campaign in western VA. Little of these advantages were attained- not necessarily on the whole because of Lee's ineptness, but because he had to juggle four incompetant brigadiers. I wonder if a larger movement as extended by P.G.T Beauregard would have had a different effect.

Few